What Trump鈥檚 return might mean for Europe, and how it鈥檚 starting to prepare for the challenges
Donald Trump鈥檚 expected foreign policy towards Europe during his second term will have far-reaching, and possibly, grave consequences.
At the end of last week, journalist suggested that the decades-long close Europe-American relationship was about to be over, whoever won the White House. And that Europeans should worry less about the presidency and 鈥渕ore about how Europe can hack it alone on a dangerous global stage鈥. Yesterday鈥檚 dismissible cynicism over declining American commitment in Europe is today鈥檚 cautionary tale. But with Trump as president that concern deepens considerably, particularly over trade and defence.
In his first presidency Trump unleashed a , tit for tats and trade wars with states, companies and regions including the EU. That trend is set to continue, if Trump鈥檚 , including imposing 10-20% , with a particular focus on key states such as Germany and key companies including .
Trump鈥檚 stated preference is to reset the supply chains , either through eye-wateringly high or ensuring greater post-manufacture assembly of foreign goods in the US. These are high stakes indeed. The US is the EU鈥檚 biggest trade partner, with ever-increasing volumes of being purchased.
Is Europe prepared?
Not only has the European Commission been sharpening its teeth on a number of trade, tech, AI and investment-related mechanisms designed to keep at bay. But the highly anticipated trade war has already , at least in terms of protecting the EU鈥檚 financial interests.
The is focused on increasing the EU鈥檚 overall self-sufficiency in big tech, including climate tech and raw materials. This will likely invite arguments with the US, as well as unresolved arguments over steel.
Trump鈥檚 antipathy to Europe isn鈥檛 new. And it isn鈥檛 entirely personal. Washington is no longer populated with policy makers with a natural empathy to, or even personal connections with, Europe. Even under presidents and Joe Biden, Washington shifted clearly, and possibly permanently, away from both Europe and towards Asia
Whether via or diminished diplomatic interest in Europe among officials in the State Department, range from indifferent at best, to hostile at worst.
Read more:
The US has moved from post-cold war levels of cooperation in 1994 in the 2000s. Now, accelerated by entrenched partisanship, isolationism and Trump鈥檚 second win, Washington remains content with 鈥渄owngrading of Europe in the psyche of American elites鈥.
This despite ( by retired US Army officer and former commanding general Ben Hodges) critically reducing the 鈥渉uge advantage we [the US] have with our leadership inside NATO and our relationship with European countries鈥. As president, Trump is simply going to accelerate this trend.
In the Baltics
Among Baltic countries there is already an expectation that Trump will push European states for spending. However, in the eyes of some, Trump鈥檚 demand is not a bad thing in and of itself.
As Tallinn-based International Center for Defense and Security director Indrek Kannik : 鈥淚f the US spends 3.5 to 4 percent on security, while Europe only spends 1.5 to 2 percent, it鈥檚 an imbalance.鈥
Kannick鈥檚 suggestion that 鈥淓urope will gradually assume more responsibility for its defense鈥 echoes perspectives increasingly advocated in Brussels itself. In effect: now is the time for Europe to acknowledge finally its lacklustre, scattered approach to defence coordination.
that Trump 2.0 鈥渨ould be so hostile to Europe 鈥 that the bloc would have no choice but to bolster its defense spending鈥.
For the Baltics, the question of improving defence coordination and sorting out financing is vital in tackling the threat of a territory-hungry Putin on its borders.
Wake up, Nato?
Last time around, Trump was fiercely critical of Nato, largely because the US provides of defence spending. Trump鈥檚 view in 2016 was that this encouraged free-riding among other members, happy to contribute less at the US鈥檚 expense.
This time, Trump has ramped up his criticism that Nato allies are still failing to spend enough. This in turn has spurred Trump to that he would 鈥渆ncourage鈥 Russia 鈥渢o do whatever the hell they want鈥 to Nato allies who fail to pay their bill.
This leaves open the question of whether the US itself would defend another member in the event of an attack, or even leave the organisation.
Trump鈥檚 options regarding Ukraine are simple: either arm it, or deny it aid. The former risks freezing battle lines and forcing an imperfect peace on Ukraine, the latter gives Russia鈥檚 President Vladimir Putin a satisfactory victory, bringing an aggressive Russia to the very doorstep of the EU and Nato.
This is particularly worrying for Baltic states: with Ukraine overpowered, of the EU and Nato would be exposed, which in turn would destabilise European collective security.
From a foreign policy perspective, the frustration is that European decision makers simply cannot be sure of what Trump will actually do next. As journalist , the US 鈥渁t its peak had more going for it than overwhelming strength. It had a certain amount of predictability. Without either, its purchase on events can鈥檛 be the same鈥.
Friends in some places
Trump鈥檚 victory will be warmly welcomed by some Europeans, particularly those from who will now be confident in a White House that shares their ideological approaches. Similarly, Trump may even lend active support to far-right governments in Hungary and Italy.
There are opportunities aplenty. has spent years personally cultivating a deep connection with Trump and Maga-Republicans. And Italy鈥檚 prime minister Giorgia Meloni could continue the same balancing act she has within the EU on key issues including immigration.
Others, like the UK and the European Commission, are going to have to play either the pragmatist card, or be prepared to hit back, and hit hard against everything from isolationist tariffs to vanishing defence commitments.
This article was first published in The Conversation on 7 November 2024